THE PROCESSES, STRUCTURES AND ACTORS IN THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

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Abstract

This article identifies and interrogates the conceptual issues surrounding the philosophy of democratic control of the military in new democracies from a liberal-pluralist perspective. Such control aims at curbing the military's power and aligning it with civilian-crafted defence policies. It is observed that the dominant paradigm neglects the role of societal and external forces in the process of democratic control. Prominence is largely given to governmental institutions notably; the executive, legislature, and to some extent, the civil society. The article employs the comparative, historical, institutional, and structural tools of reconceptualising the theory and practice of civilian control of the military in new democracies. It is argued that democratic control of the military is a multifaceted process involving many actors. These cover legitimated state organs including military leaders, societal or domestic non-governmental forces, and international actors. They exercise respective functions in institutionalising democratic control. The article notes that the trajectory of the democratic control of the military in Africa, Asia, and Latin America depends on inconsistencies in Western influences on the domestic political environments of such states.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, Democratic Control, Military, New Democracies

Introduction

The term 'civil-military relations' is a broad concept that covers the basis, trends, implications and outcomes of the power relations arising from the dynamic and complex set of interactions existing between the military institution and the economic, political, and social realms of the national, as well as international environments in which it operates. A major subject of study in civil-military relations is the control of the military. This has remained a subject of academic interest since antiquity with ideas relating to the problem of controlling 'the guardians' of the State. Examples include Sun Tzu in ancient China, the Poet Juvenal of Rome, and Niccolo Machiavelli of medieval Florence. In contemporary works, the role of the guardians has been recognised as a major consequence of the societal factors that exist in a country (Huntington, 1957: 2).

In a democracy, the military's role is shaped by the directives, monitoring, assessments, and sanctions emanating from authorised civil institutions of the State.

Depending on the form of democratic system practiced, or constitutional provisions of a country, these institutions enjoy the right of control over the armed forces. In one-party states like China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam, the military historically grew out of the ruling party during revolutionary struggles. It is subject to the ideology and directives of the State through the party structure. Thus, it is more, or less an arm of the party from which the state derives its power and legitimacy. Within the liberal-pluralist paradigm, democratic control in countries such as Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, is said to exist when the military is subordinate not to the ruling party, but to the apex institutions, or governmental arms of the State, which allow other non-governmental actors like the civil society to play some roles in the process of control by societal oversight. By implication, therefore, democratic control of the military is established and thus, consolidated when a plurality of actors are able to perform their respective functions and roles to have an effective and efficient military force that is subordinate to the aspirations of the society.

The role of the military in a newly established democratic system of governance is a function of its acceptance to obey and be accountable to society through direct governmental institutions and scrutiny from societal and international frameworks. Democratic governance generally involves a multiplicity of players whose functions in various degrees, determine the processes and outcomes of decision-making. Accordingly, civilian control is viewed as an interactive process where 'all decisions regarding the composition, use, and resource allocation for the military are taken by democratic leadership and scrutinised by the legislature in line with legitimacy and popular support' (Lunn, 2003: 13). These decisions are taken and executed in a process that involves a spectrum of designated actors spanning the executive, legislative, bureaucratic, military, judicial, societal and international realms.

For the purpose of this article, the liberal-pluralist perspective is adopted. The philosophical basis for the control of the military in most of the new democracies is drawn from Western models of parliamentarianism and presidentialism.

The conception of the term 'new democracies' can be understood within historical and political circumstances. These are states that were once under military, one-party or socialist rule. Between the last three decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century, many states in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America gradually adopted or reverted to the governance models operating in Western Europe and North America. This entailed 'mimicking' the general attributes and structures of civilian control of the military from the older democratic countries under the guise of security sector reform as articulated by their external development partners.

This article, therefore, identifies and interrogates the conceptual issues in processes, structures and actors associated with control of the military in new democracies. The choice of the scope for this article is justified by the fact that the notion of 'new democracies' is a global phenomenon. For this reason, therefore, the choice of case studies from the global perspective helps in providing more or less generalised contexts as to the actors, processes and structures required in the

democratic control of the military. In this sense, it attempts this exercise within the context of a general assumption. It argues that democratic control of the military is a multifaceted process and is said to be strong when legitimated State organs, societal and international actors can effectively play their respective roles towards institutionalising accountable governance of the civil and non-civil (including the military) realms of the State. This role covers a range of activities spanning policy advocacy and formulation, supervision, monitoring, legislation, sanctioning, coordination, direction, and compliance. These actors are grouped into governmental actors as the elected executives, the legislature, the judiciary, the civilian-led defence ministry, and the military leadership, while the non-governmental actors are the media, civil society, the intelligentsia, and external actors sometimes referred to as development partners.

The article methodically employs qualitative analysis in a thematic presentation style to prescribe the criteria for conceptualising 'democratic control' of the military in a new democracy. It is divided into four important sections: introduction, an interrogation of concepts and paradigms in the existing body of literature, re-conceptualising democratic control of the military in new democracies, and conclusion.

Democratic Control of the Military: Conceptual Perspectives

The literature on democratic control of the military is one of the many dimensions in the accumulated works on civil-military relations. It covers definitions, descriptions, and explanations of the subject matter. From the liberal-pluralist perspective, there is an agreement that one of the major attributes of a democratic system is the civilian control of the military, or to be specific, with respect to liberal democracy (Karl, 1990: 2; Diamond, 2002: 213; Kura, 2009: 271). It is important to state that the discourse on civilian control of the military is not restricted to those countries adhering to a liberal-pluralist trajectory of democracy, but extends to other forms of polities that span the history of state formation. Civilian control has been identified in ancient China, where it is noted that military command was subordinated to the political structures of the imperial court (Fukuyama, 2012: 135-137). This is reinforced by the prescriptions of strategist Sun Tzu (1999: 125) as the military commander receiving his orders from the ruler. In a study of Athenian civil-military relations, Bogna (2006:10) notes that the autonomy of the council of generals (strategia) was curtailed by civilians to prevent military intervention. Due to the treachery and intrigues that plagued the warring city-states of the 16th century Italy, Machiavelli (1999: 41) prescribed close monitoring and dismissal (where necessary) of suspicious and incompetent military commanders, respectively.

In the modern era, Huntington (1957) gives a more detailed examination of civilian control by defining it within objective and subjective categories: an objective type exists where the ideological base of the country is geared towards establishing and enhancing military professionalism. The power of civilian groups and that of the military are balanced where each keeps to its sphere of professional competence. In addition, Luckham (1971: 22) notes that political constraints and professional self-

interest are the driving forces that shape objective civilian control. In the subjective type, military professionalism is compromised as a result of politicisation and this has to do with the ideological intrusion of civilian groups into the sphere of military matters (Huntington, 1957: 80-85). By implication, objective control where civil and military powers are separated is the prescription for states adopting a liberal political system. On the basis of autonomy, objective control can be either delegative or assertive. In the first case, the civilian leaders assign certain aspects of authority to the military, which lacks the expertise to make decisions. In the second case, a lack of trust compels civilian authorities to directly monitor the military by intruding into its sphere of professional competence (Feaver, 1992: 7-9). Objective civilian control is derived from the experiences of countries in North America and Europe in the last three centuries. Democratic control from the perspective of oversight is seen as a strategic interaction involving two players - the principal who is the democratically-elected civilian leader and the agent, which is the military. An important point to note is that the military is not seen as a player in the control process but as a delegated actor with no choices in decision-making. Its level of compliance determines the type of rewards, or punishments it receives from the civilian principals (Feaver, 2003).

The fused approach, a critique of the separation model explains civilian control from the perspective of an agreement between the military, political elites, and the citizens on issues of governance that pertain to the jurisdiction of military power (Schiff, 2009: 32-33). Case studies of India, Israel, and Pakistan are used to demonstrate the relevance of the fused approach. The significance of this approach lies in the argument that a political system does not necessarily have to adhere to Huntington's model of separate civil and military institutions, but must be based on the autonomous specialisation and competence of the military institution to carry out its security function.

From the liberal-pluralist lens, democratic control of the military can be conceived from a number of progressive waves of debates one of which is christened by its critics as 'the first generation problematic' conceptualises the issue by giving exclusivity to elected leaders namely; the executive and the legislature, as the sole custodians of democratic control of the military (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002b: 6). Democratic control is simply based on the principle of civilian supremacy with the authority to exercise parliamentary oversight (Born, 2006:153). In explicit terms, the executive and legislative arms of a democratic government should have a monopoly over the control of the military (Kuehn, 2018: 163). The second wave takes a broader view by its recognition of both governmental and societal actors as elements in the process of democratic control of the military (Douglas, 2015: 20). In other words, non-governmental actors such as civil society play an important role in ensuring that the 'tenets of transparency and accountability' are applicable to the existence and operational use of the military (Ebo, 2005: 4). In recognition of the forces of democratisation and their impact on civil-military relations, the third argument, apparently, incorporates certain actors in the international arena as part of the players that shape democratic control of the military (Matei, 2013: 3

Actors in Democratic Control of the Military

The liberal-democratic arena is assumed to be shaped by a multiplicity of actors. By extension, democratic control of the military involves a range of actors that include the governmental leaders, wider civilian elite, civil society, military top brass, and officer corps (Huntington, 1956: 380-384). These actors have been identified in different ways depending on the roles they are expected to play. In the case of oversight of the military in American-style presidentialism, Feaver (2003: 98-99), while identifying two sets of players or actors, goes further to break them into multiple sets of principals (the president, legislature, and defence secretary) and multiple sets of agents (the army, navy, air-force, marines, the quasi-autonomous joint staff, etc.). In most presidential systems, the executive enjoys the direct control of the military, while the legislature acts as a check to regulate executive power over the military and to hold both accountable through procedural scrutiny of its missions and budgetary expenses. Feaver's submission is problematic as it is largely based on the civil-military experiences in the United States. It does not take into cognisance the European model or the variations in presidential democracies across the globe and the command structures of their respective militaries.

Another work that examines the 'new democracies' of Eastern Europe identifies in clear terms, five actors and their respective roles in the process of control. Two are principal actors, that is, the executive and legislature, while the rest, may be seen as constituting societal actors - the media, civil society, and non-governmental experts (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002b: 6-9). The principals, more or less enjoy the prerogatives of making decisions concerning the role of the military in terms of the formulation, supervision, control, and oversight of defence and military policies. While defence policy as an exclusive civilian prerogative covers guidelines on the deployment and use of military force, military policy is an aspect that is jointly agreed upon by the military and its civilian principal. It dwells on the structure, doctrines, training, equipment, and missions of the military (Croissant & Kuehn, 2017: 4).

With reference to democratic governance in the security sector of African states, the five key actors are identified based on either the formal roles they play in governance structures or the influence wielded in the policy process. Military leadership is categorised as part of the process of converting policy or law into projecting military power during authorised missions. The legislative and executive actors handle the management and oversight of the organisations authorised by law to use force. The third is the judiciary and other public bodies charged with ensuring that such coercive bodies are constrained from, or penalised for harming public safety. Civil society and non-state security actors are seen as those who exert varying degrees of influence over the process and outcome of governance (Ball & Fayemi, 2004: 17).

However, the capacity of supportive actors as manifested in 'societal oversight' is recognised as a 'formal element' in the democratic control process (Douglas, 2015). These are civil society, the media, and the intellectual community. While these actors do not formally exercise control over the military, they can serve as interest

articulators by making technical and ethical inputs for decision-making within the executive and legislative circles. A functional civil society enhances public scrutiny of the military and its principals (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002b: 9). The media is seen as an important means of communication between the government, society and the military (Douglas, 2015: 21). The intellectual community, drawn from the ivory tower and research centres has relevance in the theorisation and application of ideas towards revolution in military doctrines, technology and industrialisation, which is what obtains in the well-established democracies.

Democratic Control of the Military: Characteristics

Based on the experiences in Western Europe and North America, some perspectives identify what is viewed as the fundamental attributes of democratic control of the military. There exist conceptual variations, especially in the use of the term 'civilian control' in some writings with a shift to 'democratic control' in more recent works on the subject.

In the first submission where Quaker-Dokubo (2002: 41-43) uses the term 'civilian control', three broad features highlighted below are required to manifest for control to be effective in a democratic setting:

1. There should be a clear role for the military in a democratic setting;
2. There should be an effective governance mechanism based on an independent judiciary and the rule of law to ensure accountability of the military to the legislature; and
3. The government should check the power of the military either by limiting its numerical size and resource base, consigning it to external missions, or establishing a parallel agency to serve as a countervailing force.

A problem with this submission is the detachment of structural peculiarities in newly democratising states. This is evident in Africa where weak institutions, economic crisis and the resultant instability compels ruling civilian groups to rely on coercive military power to suppress political opposition and societal agitations. This is the case for countries like Nigeria, Chad, and the Congo Democratic Republic.

A second position adopts the term 'democratic control' where three sources provide five attributes, which can also be viewed as conditionalities: there should be a clearly defined legal, or constitutional framework that places a division of jurisdiction between civilian authorities and the military institution. By implication, it must comply with the separation model of civil-military relations; a clear chain of command should be in place with the civilian leaders giving directives to the military and holding its actions accountable through legislative oversight; a civilian-led supervisory agency or defence ministry should operate and the military command should be subordinated to this agency.

In essence, the military should be subject to bureaucratic-supervisory control by civilians who are answerable to elected authority; the existence of civil society and other non-governmental actors that indirectly play advocacy

roles in the policy environment; and the defence budget should be under the scrutiny of civilian leaders at both formulation and implementation levels (Born, 2006: 158-159; Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002b: 7; Joo, 1996: 5).

The third position pursues five objectives in the establishment of democratic control. These are military effectiveness, military efficiency, governmental support, societal support, and military cooperation through its expertise to defend the state and the society (Cleary, 2006: 43). Ebo (2005) provides some prescriptive, but intrinsic features that should define the role of security forces and the military (inclusive) in a democratic setting. These are: the military is obliged to be accountable and transparent to the civilian authorities by adhering to the principles of public expenditure management, as well as domestic constitutional law and international law; there should be a clear hierarchy of authority between civilian leaders and the military; on their part, civilian authorities must have the capacity for control and oversight of the military, which creates a conducive environment for an active role in social monitoring and participation in policy reform by civil society; and the civilian authorities must provide access to professional training of the military and security forces that are aligned with democratic practices and formulate policies within sub-regional and regional requirements (Ebo, 2005: 4). These perspectives, while having some variations are based on the experience of Eastern Europe where the North Atlantic Alliance transplanted the liberal ethos of civil-military governance after the collapse of the communist rule. The recipients include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania. Similarly, the post-Socialist States of Europe had strong and functional state structures before they transited to parliamentary democracies. As such, they did not face the quantum of institutional challenges faced by transiting states in parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Determinants of Democratic Control

In examining civilian control of the military in less developed states, the factors of legitimacy and effectiveness are essential conditions. Society must regard the type of political system in operation as legitimate (Goldsworthy, 1981: 55). This, in turn, leverages public institutions to be effective. In essence, civilian control is said to be established when the institutions of the state are legitimate and effective. Recent literature identifies the structural criteria under which democratic control of the military takes place.

Cleary and McConville (2006: 8) identify six major factors for what they term the 'democratic management' of the military institution. These are: the degree of cooperation, or confrontation between civilian authority and the military; the ability of civilian leaders to differentiate between 'state security' and 'regime security'; the degree of dynamism in defence policy direction; and the legislative capacity to perform oversight functions of the military. This reflects the extent to which military power can effectively meet the requirements of the changing security architecture. High democratic control implies that the military is compelled, or persuaded to align

itself with the aspirations of elected leaders. In polities where the factionalised civilian groups are diametrically opposed to each other's interests, the military may exploit such an opportunity to resist directives from civil authority. In unstable polities, the tendency is for the ruling group to preserve its monopoly of power over and above societal aspirations for change and the military is often hijacked to preserve the status quo. This depends on the quality of the roles, strategies, resources allocated, and goals agreed upon by authorities for the military. To some extent, capacity depends on the expertise that the legislature possesses on military matters and how it can leverage to have control over the efficiency and effectiveness of the military's role. An institutional challenge exists in countries where the military command has supplanted the civilian bureaucracy charged with the administrative and fiscal aspects of defence management policy. In Myanmar, for instance, the military (*Tatmadaw*) has retained extensive prerogatives under the 2008 constitution after the transition to democratic rule. It controls the defence and interior ministries in addition to having veto power over parliamentary decisions relating to defence and foreign policies (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018: 206). These prerogatives were leveraged to displace the civilian government in a coup d'état in February 2021, when the outcome of the general elections was not in favour of its organisational interests. The last determinant of civilian control is the level of social capital cultivated between the military, government, and society. Suspicion can lead to either intrusive monitoring of the military by civilian leaders as suggested by Feaver (2003: 91) in an old presidential democracy like the United States, or inversely results in persistence by military leaders to retain certain areas of decision-making related to defence policy as is the case during the early years of Nigeria's Fourth Republic (Aiyede, 2013: 167-168). It is important to point out that these determinants do not take into cognisance the history and trajectory of democratic transition for fragile states like Egypt, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, or Thailand where the military continues to play a central role in decision-making amidst a factionalised group of civilian elites.

In his submission, Houngnikpo (2010: 129) prescribes three fundamental pillars that must be present for democratic control of the military. With reference to Africa, he advocates for 'tight normative constraints' on the military to reduce its 'political' influence. Secondly, while adopting the objective model of Huntington (1957), Houngnikpo (2010) argues for a clear separation of the civilian and military spheres of power. Finally, the military should be clearly differentiated from other legally sanctioned institutions of coercion like the police, or paramilitary bodies on the basis of restricting the military to external missions. Democratic control of the military is viewed as a multi-purpose policy for either curbing the power of the military or aligning military policy with civilian-crafted defence policy. In the same light, there is the responsibility of ensuring that human rights are not subject to violations by the military and other security forces; there is a need to provide legitimacy by elected civilians to military operations and to generally strike a balance between the functional and societal imperatives of the military (Born, 2006: 155). Many countries that recently transited to democracies in Africa, Asia, and Latin

America have weak civilian institutions and thus, are unable to curb the prerogatives of the military and other security agencies. Countries such as Nigeria employed certain mechanisms like the purging of the officer corps in the struggle to establish democratic control of their militaries. This has been discussed by Young (2006: 24-29) as in imposing certain limitations on missions, size, and budget, promotion of military professionalism in order to forestall praetorian tendencies, imposition of constitutional and legal limitations, and having a free press that facilitates societal scrutiny of the military institution. From the angle of presidential control of the military, Feaver (2003: 94) similarly identifies intrusive monitoring of defence policy, budget cuts, purges, and court-martial as ways to punish the military for counteracting civilian directives. However, in a study of civilian and military groups in Venezuela, Trinkunas (2005: 5) identifies the restriction of the military to missions beyond the country's borders as the best and most effective strategy for establishing civilian control in a democracy. These short and medium-term strategies are valuable for civilian governments, but for democratic control to be self-sustaining, there is a need to establish principles, norms, and rules that are clearly accepted by civilian and military leaders, which define the responsibilities of the key players who ensure stability and sustenance in democratic governance.

Re-conceptualising Democratic Control of the Military in New Democracies

Democratic control of the military is a product of many actors and their corresponding functions. As a multifaceted process, these actors exercise different functions, which collectively provide the nature and basis for democratic control of the military. Based on the General Systems theory, democratic control is viewed as a system whose general function is dependent on the roles of the parts that constitute it. Each part has its functional boundary in various degrees. It interacts with the rest of the system and the role it plays affects its character and efficacy (Winter & Bellows, 1981: 24). Thus, democratic control of the military represents the whole, while the different actors and the roles they play are the parts that collectively translate to the whole. The process of democratic control is made up of four categories of actors that exercise functions specific to each of them. The first category consists of the elected civilians as in the elected branch of the executive arm (that is, the president, cabinet, or prime minister) and the legislature who take decisions at the highest level concerning the establishment, funding, equipping, roles, and operations of the military. The political executive (who is the president, prime minister, or executive cabinet) makes policy decisions concerning the operational use of the military. The legislature exercises control by legitimising the missions of the military and preventing the misuse of military power within the scope of the appropriative and legal powers conferred on it. It should be able to hold the military accountable for its actions during peacetime, emergency periods, and internal, or foreign missions (Giraldo, 2006: 35-36). However, this depends on the powers conferred on it by the constitution of the country. This is in addition to the goals, integrity, aspirations, and calibre of those who constitute the legislature (Jimoh, 1999: 3).

The second category of actors covers three legitimated institutions; the judiciary, the Ministry of Defence, and the military leadership (high command). They represent the adjudicative, bureaucratic, and strategic aspects of the democratic control process. The judiciary as one of the three arms of government should be able to hold military personnel accountable when the fundamental laws of the state are violated (Quaker-Dokubo, 2002: 42). The military is expected to accept the supremacy of judicial decisions within the scope of civilian directives and the constitution. While it does not enjoy the prerogative of interfering in the military justice system, the judiciary should have the capacity for judicial review of court-martial cases on appeal to civilian courts of competence (Ball & Fayemi, 2004: 21; Ojo, 2006: 260). The Ministry of Defence exists as a civilian-led interface agency between the political executive and the military leadership. It is the bureaucratic stage of the executive's control of the military. For it to be effective, it must have jurisdiction over the administrative and fiscal aspects of defence policy. Its major function is to supervise and ensure that the military is able to carry out policy directives to its logical ends at the lowest possible costs to the country (Bruneau & Goetze Jr, 2006: 78-82).

The military high command is a crucial actor in the process of civilian control of the military in a democratic environment. It is made up of the service chiefs who are heads of the conventional branches - army, navy, and air force. The high command is to the military institution what the brain is to the human body. Since representation is a feature of modern democracy, military leaders must provide professional representation for their constituency in their interactions with decision-makers and societal actors. They serve as the 'hinge' between the Ministry of Defence and the service branches (comprising officers and men under its control) to facilitate compliance with civilian directives (Agwunobi, 1992: 55). This applies to both objective and subjective types of civilian control as no military force can be controlled without its commanders. Politicians and bureaucrats depend on the service chiefs for the democratic control of the military institution to be established as it is a process requiring shared responsibility between civilian and military leaders (Bland, 2001: 9-10). The factors of social trust and cooperation between the civilian and military leaders are important for defining the roles and jurisdiction of the armed forces (Cleary, 2006: 8). Its general functions are as follows: (1) to establish a partnership with civilian authorities to insulate the military from the partisan persuasions of elected groups and opposition (Yoroms, 2012: 139-140); (2) to facilitate the internalisation of the norms and values that project the supremacy of civil institutions of the state (Welch & Smith, 1974: 6); (3) to synthesise policy directives received from the civilian principals into strategy; and (4) to apply strategy towards the attainment of policy objectives within the context of military doctrines. In a pyramidal pattern, the military leadership enjoys strategic control over the operational commanders who, in turn, supervise the lower hierarchy of the military to execute directives. The role of military leaders is crucial in establishing or restoring civilian control in a democracy confronted by instability and crises of political legitimacy. For example, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez

survived a civilian-led uprising in April 2002 due to the military command's refusal to legitimise the opposition's claim to power (Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas, 2009).

The domestic societal actors as the civil society, the media, and the intellectual community, or intelligentsia serve as the social bridge between the government and the society (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002a: 47). They make inputs on the culture of civilian control of the military institution, and the direction of military reform and transformation. Civil society is that active segment of society that is involved in articulating and advocating for proper governance of the military institution. This involves scrutinising the actions of both the government and the military on a wide range of issues that cover human rights abuses, the basis for military missions, budgetary allocations, and equipment procurements (Fluckiger, 2008). However, the role of civil society varies from one country to another. In cases where democratic culture has not taken root, civil groups can serve as both a pillar of civilian authority and a check on military praetorianism (Gaji, 2016: 564-565). In Argentina, the military 'recused' itself from supporting the elected government of Fernando De la Rua in December 2001 amidst mass opposition to harsh economic policies. The president was eventually forced to resign (Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas, 2009). In some countries, civil society has been involved in facilitating military intervention to displace elected civilian leaders. Examples include Chile's Salvador Allende in 1973, Sudan's Sadiq Al-Mahdi in 1989, Pakistan's Nawaz Sharif in 1999, and Egypt's Mohamed Morsi in 2013.

Another societal actor is the media, which plays an important role in political communication and role perceptions among the civilian authorities, the military, and society. Depending on societal perceptions, the media can serve as an ally or an adversary of the military (Scholtz, 1998). The intelligentsia largely interacts with civilian and military leaders in formulating and evaluating defence policy as it pertains to strategic planning, budgeting, procurement, and the development of a technological base. As think tanks, they can assist the civilian authorities to enhance monitoring and direction (Bland, 1999, p. 13).

The last category, which is often not highlighted in most writings consists of actors emanating from the international stage. Sometimes referred to as development partners or agents of the global hegemon, they consist of foreign governments, inter-governmental organisations, and transnational non-governmental bodies. The relevance of these actors is hinged on the decision in the 1990s to link development assistance to the idea of security sector reform in less developed countries facing economic crises (Brzoska, 2003). Western governments pushed creditor and donor bodies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund including regional bodies such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU) to place the principle of good governance as an agenda for non-democratising states. These 'development partners' engage with the governmental and non-governmental actors in the domestic environment of a country to support democratisation as a condition for assistance in addressing pressing economic needs such as loan requests and debt relief. In the same direction, such assistance is extended for the professionalisation of the military so that it continues to accept the supremacy of civil institutions. This

'conditional' assistance for democratising states is also meant to boost the effectiveness and efficiency of their militaries and enhance civilian control during internal and external missions. Military effectiveness is geared towards obedience to elected authorities within the context of defence policy, while military efficiency has to do with carrying out missions at an acceptable cost to society (Bruneau & Trinkunas, 2008: 10). The governments of Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States have in different ways extended military assistance to many African, Asian and Latin American states as part of the drive for security sector reform. With respect to Africa, the United States provides military training, intelligence, and equipment sales using platforms namely; the Africa Command (AFRICOM), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Military Professionals Resource Incorporated (MPRI). The goal of such arrangements is to promote its security interests in the continent by enhancing the military effectiveness of recipient states. In the case of post-communist Europe, the trend is for a candidate country to get co-opted into transnational security outfits namely; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). International non-governmental bodies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlight the levels of human rights compliance by the military during missions within, or beyond a country's borders. They can lobby foreign governments to halt military assistance to a country that is seen as derailing democratic tenets. They provide financial and technical support to domestic interest groups who engage their governments in reform directions for the military institution.

It must be noted that these categories of actors operate within a contextual structure, each occupying a position in the process of control as principal, monitor, supervisor, or agent. The operational structure of democratic control of the military in a new democracy can be represented as a concentric arena (see Figure 1) where the military leaders or strategic commanders are positioned at the heart of this process as gatekeepers and facilitators. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) forms the next echelon as the supervisor of defence policy. It enjoys delegated authority emanating from its elected principals. The next circle is the decision-making environment involving three principles - executive, legislature, and judiciary. They respectively have the authority to formulate and direct military operations and legitimise defence policy, and adjudicate on military matters. Societal forces constitute the fourth circle they scrutinise or support the military and its principles. The authority to use military forces and its outcome are aspects of interest and discourse among the media, civil society, and intelligentsia. The international actors exert influence on civilian leaders, society and the military to establish and sustain the policy of civilian control of the military through punishments and rewards.

Figure - 1   Conceptual Model of Democratic Control of the Military in New Democracies

Democratic control of the military can be gauged as high, moderate, or low based on the examination of five critical decision-making areas of possible contestations between the military and civilian leaders. When civilian leaders enjoy a monopoly to make decisions in these critical areas and the military accepts their prerogatives, democratic control can be regarded as high. Inversely, when the military shares, or dominates decision-making in these areas, democratic control is said to be low (Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, Volkel & Wolf, 2011: 78-79; Croissant & Kuehn, 2017: 4). The capacities and dispositions of civilian elites and the military determine the degree to which democratic control can be exercised and sustained. The first is the sphere of elite recruitment - the process and criteria for selecting and legitimising civilian leadership. The military must accept the mechanism by which civilian leaders are periodically selected and must accept their right to make decisions on behalf of the electorate. In situations of intra-civilian power struggles, the military may have a role in deciding how political succession takes place through the execution of a palace coup. For example, the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) has been involved as a player in the succession struggles within the ZANU-PF ruling party and by extension, the government. The Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) intervened in concert with rival factions within the ruling party to replace Robert Mugabe with Emmerson Mnangagwa as president, in November 2017. The second has to do with public policy-making. This implies that the military should not be setting the agenda in policy-making. Similarly, civilian leaders should have effective police and intelligence services to prevent military intrusion into internal security matters. In Colombia and Nigeria, the police forces are overwhelmed and unable to tackle internal security threats. This has resulted in the military assuming peacekeeping and quasi-policing roles. In fact, the Colombian military and police forces are jointly controlled by the Ministry of Defence.

The fourth is the arena of defence policy where civilian leaders must have the capacity to decide when, where, and how military forces are deployed. In Pakistan, military autonomy has resulted in successive civilian governments sharing decision-making with a high command on the country's nuclear deterrence strategy. The final arena lies in a military organisation. In this case, civilians may decide to be intrusive or grant autonomy to military leaders to make such decisions. This depends on the expertise that civilian leaders have on military policy and the level of mutual trust established by the government and military leaders. This covers training and operational doctrine, strategic planning, budgeting, technology, procurement, and personnel recruitment. However, the principles and practices of the military organisation must be aligned with the policy objectives laid down by civilian decision-makers. In states such as Egypt, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Thailand, which have semblances of electoral democracy, the military enjoys prerogatives over internal security, national defence, and military organisation to the detriment of factionalised civilian groups.

Conclusion

This article examined the issues surrounding the phenomenon of democratic control of the military in new democracies. The dominant paradigm in the literature was discovered to have neglected the role of societal and external forces in the phenomenon of democratic control of the military. It generally gives prominence to governmental institutions notably, the executive and legislature. In retrospect, it is important to recall the roles played by the domestic social forces of these countries and the currents of political globalisation in shaping the transition of these countries that were under single-party, military, or personal rule. Thus, the structure and process of democratic control of the military in these countries should include a wider range of actors as the environment of democratic governance involves the participation (in various degrees) of governmental, societal, and international players whose respective roles determine the trajectories and efficacies of political development.

In the same light, there is a gap between the ideal situation and the real world with respect to the benchmark for assessing the concept and practices associated with the democratic control of the military. In other words, there is no uniformity in the applicability of what is considered to be democratic control of the military for all countries. This is in terms of the features, roles, and impacts. Trends indicate some divergence and this has to do with three major reasons. These are: the nature of democratic transition; the level of political stability; and the strategic interests of external forces. With reference to countries like Argentina, the last military junta was compelled by social discontent, an economic crisis and pressures to relinquish power to civilians after the 1982 disastrous Falklands War with Britain. Successive civilian governments leveraged on this opportunity to consolidate control of the military. In retrospect, politicians and civil servants in India formed an alliance to exclude the military from having any prerogatives and internalise the values of civilian supremacy.

With reference to political stability, the legitimacy of civilian leaders and the political order are important in defining the role of the military either as a veto player, or a submissive agent. In the same direction, this heavily depends on the affinity that societal forces have with state institutions and their leaders (Finer, 2002: 87). When societal attachment to public institutions in a new democracy is weak, there is a tendency for democratic control of the military to be low and vice versa. This has been the case in Pakistan where there has been an alternation of civilian and military regimes since its independence in 1947. The military has established itself as an autonomous guardian of the state and thus, shaped the national defence and security directions for the country due to the intense and entrenched factionalism of civilian elites.

The strategic interests of the Western powers in the political developments of new democracies determine their reactions with regard to the outcomes of civil-military struggles for control of political power. This is exemplified in their soft posture toward the apparent truncation of democratic transitions in countries like Algeria in 1992, Pakistan in 1998, Egypt in 2013, and Thailand in 2014. An unsuccessful coup attempt in 2016 by some military units in Turkey against the pro-Islamist-AK government was accompanied by mute reactions from Western capitals. In contrast, Nigeria came under intense diplomatic pressure between 1993 and 1998 in an effort to end the military rule. As such, there is no universal applicability in the policy of democratic promotion by such powers either through their governments, or international bodies because each case study is shaped by the interests to be pursued. For new democracies, the structures and actors in the process of control of the military vary as each country in question has its own peculiarities in terms of history, institutions, and vulnerabilities to external influences.

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